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No one could ever have seriously accused Jeremy Bentham of
being a man of few words. His published work, by H.L.A. Hart's
accounting, "run[s] to many millions of words and there is still
more to come."1 It is a truly impressive literary output. Even more
impressive is the huge amount of reading Professor Hart has done
in Bentham's corpus. Twenty years ago, when Hart estimated that
what had then been published of Bentham's work came close to six
million words, he also estimated that he had read nearly half.2
Now he does not even hazard a guess as to the amount he has read,
though many millions of words would not, I suspect, misrepresent
the total. This quantity alone is of course impressive, but when one
reminds oneself of the plodding character of so much of Bentham's
prose, the many pages spent on elaborate and tedious detail
shaped by countless divisions and subdivisions of whatever topic is
under discussion, Professor Hart's accomplishment takes on heroic
proportions. That one cannot read very far into one of Bentham's
theoretical works without becoming weary and distracted has
meant that those with a serious interest in his theories have had to
depend on the few expositors and commentators who have perse-
vered. Professor Hart is one of the few, and in this collection of
eleven essays he expounds and criticizes, with the clarity and acu-
ity of thought for which he is widely admired, Bentham's legal and
political philosophy. For these essays, each of us who once had the
t Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University.
1 H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 1 (1982).
2 Id. at 40, 41, reprinting in substantially similar form Hart, Bentham and Beccaria,
in ATi DEL CONVEGNO INTERNAZIONALE SU CESARE BECCARA 20 (1966).
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inclination to read Bentham but who lacked the time, patience,
and powers of concentration necessary to do so at length should be
very grateful.
Only one of the essays is wholly new. The others either con-
tain substantial parts of previously published articles or are re-
vised or expanded versions of such articles, the revisions in all
cases being inconsequential. Hart has arranged the essays so that
the reader receives, from the early ones, a general introduction to
Bentham's thought and is then presented, in the later ones, with
critical studies of positions Bentham held on central issues in ana-
lytical jurisprudence. In the early essays Hart explains Bentham's
aims and methods as an expositor and critic of the law, surveys the
range of questions Bentham addressed in carrying out these aims,
discusses the early influence of Beccaria on Bentham and the simi-
larities and differences in their views, and recounts the change in
Bentham's opinion of the United States and her democratic insti-
tutions from hostility to admiration. In the later essays Hart first
explains Bentham's conception of the structure of law, including
its conformity to a logic of imperatives (a valuable analytical tool
which Bentham's theory of law as a species of command led him to
invent), and then expounds and criticizes Bentham's analyses of
the fundamental legal concepts of duty (or obligation), right,
power, sovereignty, and command. The fifth essay, which concerns
Bentham's attack on the political doctrine, so important in his
time, that men possess natural, inalienable rights to, inter alia, life
and liberty, and which also considers John Stuart Mill's later at-
tempt to incorporate a notion of natural rights into utilitarianism,
marks the transition from the early, introductory essays to the
later, theoretical ones.
Hart's main objectives in the later essays are to dig out, usu-
ally from several different works, Bentham's analyses of the above-
listed concepts, to come, where necessary, to interpretive conclu-
sions about Bentham's considered views on questions related to
those analyses (e.g., does every ascription of a legal duty imply
that the bearer is liable to some sanction should he disobey?), and
to hold these analyses up to critical light. At the same time, in
several of these essays Hart goes beyond critical reflection on Ben-
tham's views to defend, modify, and develop further ideas which
he has expounded elsewhere and for which he is himself well
known. These excursions into contemporary debates and discus-
sions suggest a larger purpose to his essays than providing critical
exegeses of the works of a major historical figure.
Hart sees Bentham as a much abler exponent of classical legal
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positivism than Bentham's disciple, John Austin,3 from the criti-
cism of whose work Hart developed his own positivist theory.
Hence, it is fair to suppose, Hart has taken Bentham's deeper and
subtler statement of the classical theory as a challenge inviting re-
newal of that criticism and so an opportunity for testing, ex-
tending, and strengthening the theory he developed in The Con-
cept of Law.4 Guided by this larger purpose, Hart then naturally
takes up recent works that present theories opposed to legal posi-
tivism, specifically to its central thesis that law is separate from
morality. Thus, in his essay on legal duty Hart briefly examines,
and finds unsatisfactory, the views of Ronald Dworkin and Joseph
Raz, according to which the concept of a legal duty has moral im-
port; and in the last essay, which shows Raz's influence, Hart gives
an account of law as a source of authoritative reasons for action, on
the basis of which he means to show how the central positivist the-
sis is consistent with what he calls the normativity of law: how law
is separate from morality and yet has reason giving force in the
lives of those on whom it imposes duties and confers powers. Simi-
larly, in his essay on legal rights, Hart uses exposition and criticism
of Bentham's analysis of the concept of a legal right to clarify and
reinforce the opposing analysis for which Hart has argued for over
thirty years.' Then, at the essay's end, Hart considers examples
that pose difficulties for his analysis, examples of the kind to which
contemporary moral and political philosophers who share an un-
derstanding of rights more akin to Bentham's than to Hart's have
attended in working out their theories, and concedes, in view of
these examples, that his analysis does not have universal
application.
What Hart has to say on these two topics, the relation of law
to morality and the character of legal and moral rights, stands out
from his other discussions, partly because one can recognize in his
discussion of these topics substantial developments and changes in
his views, and partly because current debates on these topics are so
widespread and lively. Thus, even a reader who lacks abiding inter-
est in Bentham's theories will find plenty of ideas and arguments
to wrestle with in these essays, the later ones in particular. My own
wrestling with Hart's ideas and arguments has led me to conclude,
3 Id. at 59, 108-09.
4 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
' See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, DEFINITION AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE (1953); Hart, Are
There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REv. 175 (1955); Hart, Bentham, 48 PROC. OF THE
BRIT. AcAD. 297 (1962).
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on the one hand, that Hart need not have conceded as much as he
did to moral and political philosophers whose theories of rights
clash with his own and, on the other, that he may have to concede
more than he appears willing to to the opponents of legal positiv-
ism. The reasons why will take some explaining.
I
That we now readily consider the relation of law to morality
and the character of legal and moral rights as distinct topics testi-
fies to Bentham's great influence on our discussion of the issues
they involve. Political theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries recognized no important distinction between them. To
the contrary, the key question its authors addressed concerned the
legitimacy of sovereign power, and to answer it they constructed
theories about how rulers and magistrates came into possession of
the right to govern, that is, the rights to make and execute laws
and, in particular, to inflict punishment on those who disobeyed.
Accordingly, the positive laws of a political society were the prod-
ucts of exercises of those rights, and the rights themselves had
clear moral pedigrees. A political theorist of that age might have
described these rights as powers granted directly by God to those
who possessed them or to their ancestors. Alternatively, the theo-
rist might have described them as powers conferred on certain rul-
ers through the exercise and transfer of rights that some or all of
their subjects, or their subjects' ancestors, originally possessed,
rights that either were given to some or all men by God or were
possessed by all moral agents in virtue of their rational faculties
and knowledge of good and evil. These alternatives, and the varia-
tions on them that were advanced, thus explained the sovereign
authority that rulers and magistrates had as moral authority, and
they did so by grounding a sovereign's rights to govern in the ac-
tions of God or in the exercise by men of their God-given or natu-
ral rights. Consequently, under any of these alternatives or their
variations, laws, being products of the exercise of sovereign author-
ity, were invested with moral authority, and talk of laws having
authority distinct from their moral authority would have been dis-
missed as nonsense.
Bentham of course introduced such talk and made sense of it.6
J. BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND
A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 428 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
J. BErT'AM, A Fragment]; see also J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 18-19, 109 (H.L.A.
Hart ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as J. BENTHAM, OF LAws]. I have used Hart's essays and
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He held that to ascribe sovereign authority to some person was to
say that that person habitually issued orders and rules to a people
who, in turn, habitually obeyed him, and similarly for ascription of
sovereign authority to some body of persons.7 And since the people
were taken to constitute a political society and since the orders
and rules the sovereign addressed to them, and certain orders and
rules of his deputies, to constitute that society's law, one could
ascribe authority to its law as well. These were orders and rules
that expressed the will of the sovereign and that the people were
therefore in the habit of obeying. In this way Bentham explained
sovereign authority and the authority of law without reference to
rights and so made unnecessary the connection political theorists
of his day commonly drew between law and morality.
Bentham, however, though he largely left the religious side of
the matter alone, went further and denied that there were any
nonlegal, natural rights through the exercise of which the office of
the sovereign became invested with moral authority.8 His inten-
tion, with regard to the secular side of political theory, was, one
might say, to sever entirely this common connection between law
and morality by getting rid of its essential connecting link, and he
carried out this intention through a harsh attack on the doctrine of
the natural rights of man.' This doctrine, spelled out in a way that
captures its use from the seventeenth century to the present, holds
citations as a guide to the relevant passages in Bentham's works. I am, of course, fully re-
sponsible for whatever mistakes are to be found in my interpretation of Bentham's views.
7 I follow Bentham's formulation in Of Laws in General. J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS, supra
note 6, at 109 ("[T]he authority of the sovereign is founded ... by custom and disposition:
of habit of commanding on one side, accompanied by a habit of obeying on the other...).
Where he there acknowledges that in rare cases sovereign authority is founded on a con-
tract, but presumably he accepted Hume's view that even if a political society were founded
on a contract, the sovereign authority of its governors would soon enough be grounded else-
where. See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 539-549 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1964) (1st
ed. London 1788). For Bentham's debt to Hume, see J. BENrAM, A Fragment, supra note
6, at 439-41, 439 n.y.
8 The main texts for Bentham's attack on the doctrine of the natural rights of man are
J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489 (J. Bowring ed.
Edinburgh 1843) [hereinafter cited as J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies]; J. BENTHAM, Pan-
nomial Fragments, in 3 TH WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra, at 211, 217-21 [hereinafter
cited as J. BENTHAM, Pannomial Fragments]; J. BENTHAM, Supply Without Burden, in 1
JEREMY BENTHAM'S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 279, 332-337 (W. Stark ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as J. BENTHAM, Supply Without Burden 1]. Note that a shorter version of Supply Without
Burden, which omits the discussion of natural rights, appears in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM, supra, at 585. For Bentham's attitude toward divine rights and his reason for
treating them as separate from natural rights, see J. BENTHAM, Supply Without Burden I,
supra, at 334 n.*.
9 See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, Supply Without Burden I, supra note 8, at 334 n.*.
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that (1) all human beings, or at least all who have fully developed
and undefective rational faculties, originally (that is, before any
rights are transferred) possess rights in virtue of certain natural
traits and powers they have; (2) each man originally possesses
rights of this kind equal to those that any other man originally
possesses; and (3) these rights are not granted by any human being
or conferred by the rules of any man-made institution. Against this
doctrine, as it was formulated and advocated in his time, Bentham
argued, pontificated, and even railed.
At that time, it is important to note, there were two different
theories in which the doctrine had a central place. One was dis-
tinctly newer than the other and had by then achieved prominence
as a theory in the natural rights tradition equal to if not greater
than that of the older.1" It held that the basic natural rights of
man, including especially those to life and liberty, were inalienable,
whereas on the older theory men could, and in fact did, alienate all
their natural rights. Thus the older theory explained how one, sev-
eral, or many persons in a political society had sovereign authority
by supposing a complete transfer of all natural rights by their pos-
sessors to the person or assembly of persons who had that author-
ity. The newer theory, by contrast, held that men, in establishing a
political society or in consenting to be governed by the rulers and
magistrates of an already existing political society, relinquished
some but not all of their natural rights, particularly not those to
life and liberty. Claims to the contrary made by rulers, their subor-
dinates, or other advocates of absolute and unlimited sovereign au-
thority were then denied on the grounds that men lacked the
power to alienate these basic rights. These rights were, in this
sense at least, inalienable.11 Bentham's chief objection applied to
either theory, but he directed his salvos particularly at the newer
one, whose postulation of inalienable rights and the kind of limit
on sovereign authority this entailed especially infuriated him.
Bentham's chief objection was that to talk of natural rights
10 For an account of what I call the older theory, see R. TUCK, NATUtRAL RIGHTS THEO-
RwIS: THEIR ORIGIN AND DavELOPmzNT passim (1979). For an account of what I call the
newer theory, see M. WHITE, PHIMOSOPHY OF THE AMIcAN REvoLuTON ch. 4, 5, 6 (1978).
2 The major proponents of the newer theory took the term "inalienable right" to mean
a right the possessor of which lacked the power to transfer. They did not think that a right's
being inalienable precluded its being forfeitable. Rather, the term "imprescriptible right"
was used to denote a right that could not be forfeited or lost by its possessor. See M. WWM,
supra note 10, at 196; Richards, Inalienable Rights: Recent Criticism and Old Doctrine, 29
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGicAL RESEARCH 391, 397-99 (1969); Simmons, Inalienable Rights and
Locke's Treatises, 12 PHIL. & PuB. AFFAIRS 175, 176-84 (1983).
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was to talk of rights that men possessed prior to or independently
of the laws enacted in the political societies to which they be-
longed, and such talk was irreparably confused.12 The confusion,
he held, lay in the failure to understand that rights were the prod-
ucts of positive law and not vice versa.13 The notion of a natural
right implied that of a nonlegal right, and this, to Bentham's way
of thinking, was, like round square or dry moisture, a self-contra-
dictory notion, a notion beyond repair.14 Plainly, though, this ob-
jection comes to no more than an advertisement for Bentham's
own approach; by itself it provides no reason for rejecting theories
of natural rights. Bentham did try to support the objection by
pointing to "the savages of New South Wales," who lived without
aid of government or law.15 Here were examples, Bentham as-
serted, of men who had no rights, and since champions of natural
rights typically ascribed them to all men regardless of their race or
nationality, these examples, so Bentham thought, refuted standard
theories of natural rights. Yet Bentham's reading of these exam-
ples is as tendentious as the objection he intended them to sup-
port. While the social practices of a primitive society may reflect a
people's ignorance of their natural rights, this is no more reason to
suppose that these people have no natural rights than their igno-
rance of bacteria as reflected by their society's medical or healing
practices is reason to suppose that their bodies have no bacteria
within them. One must conclude, then, that this line of objection
begs too many questions in moral and political philosophy to ad-
vance Bentham's attack on the doctrine he so vehemently opposed.
Hart, who is also unimpressed with Bentham's chief objection,
notes that Bentham raised, in connection with it, a second objec-
tion."6 Bentham sometimes argued that because natural rights were
supposedly uncreated and so undefined by laws, ascriptions of
them were completely arbitrary. Such ascriptions, according to
Bentham, were unlike the ascriptions of legal rights; while the lat-
ter were governed by criteria that the laws that created those
rights supplied, the former were governed by no criteria whatso-
ever. Consequently, disputes about natural rights were essentially
irresolvable. They were purely verbal disputes of no value to politi-
12 J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, supra note 8, at 500; J. BENTHAM, Pannomial
Fragments, supra note 8, at 221.
IS J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, supra note 8, at 523; J. BENTHAM, Pannomial
Fragments, supra note 8, at 321.
14 J. BENTHAM, Supply Without Burden I, supra note 8, at 334.
J' . BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, supra note 8, at 500-01.
1 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 82-83.
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cal theory and positively harmful to political life. Hart sees this
objection as presenting a genuine problem for any supporter of a
theory of natural rights, the problem of supplying criteria for the
ascription of such rights. It is, he says, the most serious objection
Bentham raised and one that still awaits a satisfactory reply.,' I
shall consider it at greater length after I mention what I believe is
the most powerful objection Bentham advanced against the theo-
ries of natural rights of his day.
This third objection was Bentham's argument-more exactly,
his version of Hume's argument-against the twin theses that (1)
every political society was founded on a contract the parties to
which were the original adult members of the society and through
which those whom the parties selected to rule were given authority
over their subjects; and (2) the ruler or rulers in any political soci-
ety, however many generations old, continued to have authority
over each adult subject by virtue of the latter's having consented
to obey the former.18 These propositions or their appropriate vari-
ants figured prominently in the explanations that theories of natu-
ral rights gave of how men, each of whom had the full complement
of rights necessary to govern his own life, came either collectively
to institute a government (i.e., establish a political society) or indi-
vidually to submit themselves to an already existing government
and, in either case, to relinquish some or all of their rights to those
persons in their society who were or had been selected to rule. For
to effect this transfer of rights something like the making of a con-
tract or the giving of consent had to occur. Only by such acts could
rulers acquire the rights to govern and so come to have moral au-
thority over those whom they governed. And consequently, a refu-
tation of these two propositions would put the doctrine of the nat-
ural rights of man in serious jeopardy of being pointless.
Now for our purposes, we need not consider whether Ben-
tham's argument, or Hume's for that matter, refuted these pro-
positions, since whatever faults one might find in their arguments
have been rectified by subsequent philosophers.19 Rather, of
greater interest is the question whether the refutation in fact
makes the doctrine of the natural rights of man pointless. With
17 Id. at 90.
15 J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, supra note 8, at 501-02; see also J. BENTHAM, A
Fragment, supra note 6, at 439-41, 478-79. For Hume's argument, see D. HUME, supra note
7, at 539-549.
19 See e.g., A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION ch. 3, 4 (1979).
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respect to the older of the two theories I distinguished earlier,20 the
refutation does have this effect, since the controlling purpose its
proponents had for ascribing natural rights to man was to explain
how rulers and magistrates came to have moral authority over
their subjects. With respect to the newer theory, however, one can,
despite the refutation, find some point to the doctrine that is suffi-
ciently important to justify attempts at preserving it or something
like it. For the purposes this theory's proponents had for ascribing
natural rights to man included marking off the authority that each
man rightfully retained over the conduct of his life after he had,
through contract or consent, given to some ruler or rulers a limited
authority to govern his life. These retained rights then established
grounds for complaints, protests, and acts of resistance made or
engaged in when these rulers exceeded their authority. It was to
accomplish these purposes that the newer theory's proponents
characterized the basic natural rights they ascribed as inalienable.
Their point in ascribing these inalienable natural rights to man
was to place limits on sovereign authority disregard of which by
those who possessed that authority constituted wrongful interfer-
ence with their subjects' lives. The rights were thus understood to
secure for each man who possessed them freedom, with respect to
certain areas of his life, to act as he chose in that neither the pos-
sessors of sovereign authority nor anyone else could impose on him
duties that would limit this freedom. And unjustifiable attempts to
impose such duties would then qualify as injustices or indignities
that no man should have to suffer. Of course, on the newer theory
this bilateral distribution of authority among rulers and their sub-
jects came about through the contract or consent that the latter
made or gave, and therefore the refutation of the two propositions
adverted to above21 removes the grounds for holding that this dis-
tribution necessarily obtains in a political society. But while this
result allowed Bentham, once he had his own definition of sover-
eign authority in hand, to dismiss the idea that natural rights
placed limits on sovereign authority, it left unaffected the idea that
natural rights provided grounds both for criticizing, as wrongful or
unjust, certain exercises of sovereign authority and for taking the
appropriate action in response to such wrongs and injustices. In
other words, nothing in this refutation argues against preserving
the doctrine of the natural rights of man for use in making critical
judgments about the moral 'quality of our rulers' actions and our
20 See supra text accompanying note 10.
21 See supra text accompanying note 19.
[51:668
Rights and the Authority of Law
own. And if such a use of the doctrine should prove attractive, we
should then have reason for incorporating it into moral theory.
In preserving the doctrine for this reason, we would be pre-
serving certain standards of justice and rightful conduct toward
men that the ascription of inalienable, natural rights to man was
intended to capture. Bentham, to be sure, had no use whatsoever
for such standards. As a legal positivist he denied that they played
any part in the exposition of law. As a utilitarian he denied that
there were any such standards independent of the Greatest Happi-
ness Principle. These separate denials mark the sharp distinction
he drew between the projects of the Expositor of law and those of
the Critic, 22 and one must heed this distinction in order to under-
stand the import of his arguments. His argument against the pro-
positions adverted to above provides reason for retiring the con-
cept of a natural right from analytical jurisprudence, that is, for
ending its use by the Expositor of law; but the argument gives no
support to his denying that the ascription of inalienable, natural
rights serves to indicate distinct standards of right and wrong. The
issue then concerns the standards of right and wrong available to
the Critic of law, and to resolve it in Bentham's favor, that is, to
exclude as spurious standards that the doctrine of the natural
rights of man implies, requires a different argument. This brings us
back to the objection Hart regards as Bentham's most serious, the
objection that no criteria govern ascriptions of natural rights to
man.
Admittedly, insofar as Bentham understood this objection to
be part of his campaign to rid law and jurisprudence of false and
mystifying concepts, it concerns more the projects of the Expositor
than those of the Critic; and that behind the objection lay his con-
viction that the concept of a right was essentially a legal concept
strongly suggests that this is how he understood it. Nevertheless,
its import clearly carries over to the issue concerning the standards
of right and wrong available to the Critic. Indeed, the objection fits
in well with Bentham's general attack on all standards of right and
wrong alleged to be independent of the Greatest Happiness Princi-
ple. With one ignorable exception, Bentham brought all such stan-
dards under the name "The Principle of Sympathy and Antipa-
thy" because, as far as he could tell, all applications of them by
their exponents and champions that were not disguised applica-
22 J. BEsNHqi, A Fragment, supra note 6, at 397-98. I have used 'Critic' where Ben-
tham used 'Censor.' The latter no longer has the sense that Bentham used it to express (viz.,
judge or critic). See OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY, s.v. 'censor.'
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tions of the Greatest Happiness Principle were mere expressions of
feeling, of likes and dislikes.23 One applied this principle of sympa-
thy and antipathy, Bentham maintained, without regard to any
"external consideration" or "external standard."24 It was, in other
words, no real principle; it yielded no criteria for making judg-
ments of right and wrong.25 And one can easily imagine Bentham
asserting the same points about ascriptions of natural rights made
by those who expounded or championed the doctrine of the natu-
ral rights of man.
In considering this objection I shall not try to defend the doc-
trine. My aim is different and more modest. I want to compare
what I have been calling the newer theory of natural rights with
the theory that Hart, when considering Bentham's objection, offers
as a candidate, and indeed the only candidate, for a defensible the-
ory of natural rights.26 Accordingly, I shall bring out elements in
the newer theory to which a defender could appeal, and then
briefly sketch the theory Hart offers. The latter, which Hart ab-
stracts from Mill's discussion of rights in chapter V of Utilitarian-
ism, 27 differs significantly from the "newer" theory (hereafter "the
Traditional Theory"); and in light of these differences there arise
large unanswered questions about Hart's own analyses of concepts
of natural and legal rights.
For purposes of reference I shall use Locke's Second Treatise
of Government as a guide to the Traditional Theory.28 No other
work, I believe, has a greater claim to representing systematically
the general ideas that constitute the theory. I shall use it, however,
as a guide to these general ideas only, that is, without regard to the
specific details of Locke's exposition of them. On the Traditional
Theory, all and only men who have developed and retained their
rational faculties possess natural rights, including especially the
rights to life, liberty, and property.2 9 Such men possess these rights
23 J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 17-33
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970). The one exception is what Bentham calls the princi-
ple of asceticism, though he might have called it the Greatest Misery Principle. Id. at 17-18
(defining the principle of asceticism as "approving of actions in so far as they tend to dimin-
ish happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they tend to augment it").
24 Id. at 25.
25 Id.
28 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 104.
27 J.S. MIL, Utilitarianism ch. 5, in UTrrAmAmSM, LMERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 38 (A.D. Lindsay ed. 1910).
J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (T. Peardon ed. 1952) (1st ed. n.p.
1690).
2' Id. at chap. 1U.
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because each is capable of governing his own life, that is, each is
capable of deliberating about and choosing how best to conduct his
life, how best to protect himself from life's dangers, and how best
to make his life comfortable and rewarding. Self-government is the
proper condition of fully rational human beings, and their posses-
sion of the rights to life, liberty, and property places them in a
position to act as self-governing individuals, for these rights both
secure for and confer on each of their possessors freedom and au-
thority to conduct his life.s0 Each is free in that, unless he con-
sents, he is subject to the authority of no other man, and each has
authority over his life in that, because he is competent to assume
obligations, acquire property, incur debts, and release others from
obligations and debts they owe him, he can set limits to his free-
dom and in other ways alter his moral relations with others. He
has, in other words, certain powers of self-government. Moreover,
he has these powers independently of his society's laws, for he ex-
ercises them in the context of the moral relations he has with other
members of the society. No laws, after all, are necessary for
promises and borrowings to be generative of obligations. Indeed, in
a world without political societies, in the state of nature as modem
political theorists typically imagined it, all men who possessed nat-
ural rights would, at least originally, be equally free, and each
would have, to use Locke's term, jurisdiction over his own life. 1 In
such a world each would be a sovereign.32
By contrast, madmen, idiots, infants, and, indeed, all children
before they reach the age of reason do not possess the rights to life,
liberty, and property and would not possess them even in the state
of nature. Such human beings are incapable of deliberating about
and choosing how best to conduct their lives and therefore are in-
capable of governing themselves. Accordingly, possession of these
natural rights, because of the freedom and the powers they secure
and confer, would leave those who are incapable of governing
themselves helpless and prey to life's dangers. Such individuals
are, for this reason, properly governed by others, typically parents
or closest kin, who assume the responsibilities of nourishing and
protecting them and, in the case of children, of educating them to
30 Id. at 4.
31 Id.
31 "If Man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said, if he be absolute lord of
his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody. . . for all
being kings as much as he, every man his equal.. . ." Id. at 70.
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lead independent lives when they become adults.33 In other words,
being incapable of self-government, they must be placed under the
guardianship of others, who thus assume authority over their lives,
which means they must be denied the freedom and authority that
the rights to life, liberty, and property secure for and confer on
their possessors.
Plainly then, one can find in the Traditional Theory a general
criterion for determining who among human beings possesses natu-
ral rights. Moreover, this criterion also allows one to answer certain
questions about the forfeiture and loss of natural rights. 4 To be
sure, the criterion's constitutive concepts, those of reason and of a
rational creature, are vague, and this means that in many cases
determining whether an individual has and retains fully developed
rational faculties is open to dispute. Hence, the application of
these concepts may sometimes be arbitrary. But such arbitrariness
is an ever-present feature of concepts of natural phenonema and
should not be mistaken for the kind of arbitrariness Bentham al-
leged was to be found in ascriptions of natural rights. Bentham's
allegation was that these ascriptions were completely arbitrary. He
maintained, not that they were made according to vague criteria,
but that they were made according to no criteria whatsoever. To
him the phrase natural right was merely "a sound to dispute
about."35 Hence, the way in which one determines who possesses
natural rights does not sustain his allegation, since the Traditional
Theory offers a criterion for making this determination.
Furthermore, because the theory is predicated on the idea that
the proper condition of fully rational human beings is self-govern-
ment, it also offers a criterion for determining what specific natural
rights such human beings possess. On the Traditional Theory, to
be in a position to govern a human life, whether one's own or an-
other's, is to have the responsibilities of preserving that life and,
where possible, of improving it. Accordingly, a position of self-gov-
ernment includes the responsibilities of protecting and nourishing
oneself and, where possible, of raising oneself above a brutish exis-
tence.3 6 But then such a position must also include and guarantee
the powers and freedom the occupier of that position needs to ful-
fill these responsibilities. Rights as well as responsibilities inhere in
33 Id. at 36.
- Id. at 6-7, 98.
31 8 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 557, cited in H.L.A. HART, supra
note 1, at 83.
11 J. LocKE, supra note 28, para. 6, at 5-6, para. 26, at 17.
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this position of self-government, and the concept of such a position
thus yields the criterion for determining what specific natural
rights fully rational human beings possess. In short, they are the
rights that confer on and secure for each of their possessors the
power and freedom necessary for governing his life.
Among these rights the right to life is of course uppermost.
But because the right to life secures too little freedom for self-gov-
ernment, others must be specified. 7 Accordingly, the rights to lib-
erty and property come next, and the reason for including them is
not hard to discern. Self-preservation requires not only the free-
dom to affect directly one's vital processes but also the freedom to
act as one chooses, the power to assume obligations so as to make
cooperative engagements with others possible, and the freedom
and power to appropriate and make use of material goods. These
three rights, to be sure, do not necessarily exhaust the list of natu-
ral rights that, according to this criterion, fully rational human be-
ings possess. Some writers in this tradition certainly added to and
deviated from this list.3s But for our limited aim, seeing that this
criterion can be used to determine specific rights fully rational
human beings possess suffices to bring out one promising reply to
Bentham's objection.
Yet Bentham would not have let the matter rest here. He
would have declared this so much loose talk about rights and ar-
gued that this criterion supported no bona fide rights because one
could not use it to determine the bounds to their exercise. Indeed,
he would continue, these so-called rights to liberty and property
seemed to have no bounds, and unbounded rights to liberty and
property, whatever that might mean, entailed that their possessors
could do as they pleased and take what they wanted: kill, maim,
and assault each other; destroy, damage, and seize each other's
possessions. Awarding these "rights" to human beings, he would
conclude, was a prescription for no liberty and no property, more
evidence of the confusion endemic to this theory."9
This retort brings us to the heart of Bentham's objection. Its
key assumption is that all bona fide rights have bounds, and this
assumption reflects Bentham's conviction that the concept of a
right is essentially a legal concept.40 In Bentham's view, one can
31 Id. para. 17, at 11-12, para. 23, at 15-16.
3 Notably Thomas Jefferson. For commentary see M. WroTe, supra note 10, at 222-25.
39 J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, supra note 8, at 502.
,1 "To me a right and a legal right are the same thing, for I know no other." J. BEN-
THAM, Supply Without Burden I, supra note 8, at 334; see J. BENTHAM, Pannomial Frag-
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meaningfully ascribe a right to some person, or class of persons,
only in the context of a system of law, for an ascription of a right is
meaningful only if one can determine what actions the right-holder
is permitted or entitled to perform or what goods or services he is
entitled to receive, and to determine the answers to these ques-
tions one must examine the law to see what duties the right holder
and others have. If the right holder has neither the duty to forbear
from a certain action nor the duty to perform it, then he is permit-
ted to perform it; or if he is permitted to perform a certain action
and others have the duty to forbear interfering with his performing
it, then he is entitled to perform it. Likewise, if others have a duty
to provide him with a certain good or service, then he is entitled to
receive that good or service. Bentham thought these general cate-
gories of permission and entitlement comprehended all rights,41
and he took the duties that, by their presence or absence in a sys-
tem of law, defined a specific right, whether an entitlement or a
permission, to represent directly or indicate indirectly (by their ab-
sence in the context of a whole set of duties the right holder bore)
the bounds to that right. Hence, his assumption that all bona fide
rights have bounds follows from his general analysis of all rights as
definable in relation to the duties that a system of law imposes.
It should be clear that the concept of a natural right that I
have abstracted from the Traditional Theory resists Bentham's
general analysis, not simply because it does not entail the existence
of a legal system but also because it does not entail that natural
rights have bounds. For natural rights, so conceived, are not de-
fined in relation to any duties, or at least are not defined by the
relations to duties on which Bentham based his analysis. The
rights to life and liberty, for instance, are defined in relation to
powers. A person has these rights if two conditions obtain: first,
that all others lack the power to impose duties on him, especially
duties to do or forbear from actions that directly affect his vital
processes, and second, that he has the power to assume obligations
ments, supra note 8, at 221; J. BENTHAM, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3
THE WORKS OF JEnEMY BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 155, 157-60 [hereinafter cited as J. BEN-
THAM, Complete Code of Laws]. But cf. J. BENTHAM, Pannomial Fragments, supra note 8, at
218 (acknowledging the concept of a moral or natural right but denying that these have any
determinate or intelligible meaning).
41 1 use the terms "permission" and "entitlement" as convenient labels to mark Ben-
tham's basic division of rights into two classes: "rights resulting from the absence of obliga-
tion, [which] have for their base permissive laws" and "rights resulting from obligations
imposed by the laws, [which] have for their base coercive laws." J. BENTHAM, Complete
Code of Laws, supra note 40, at 181.
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that restrict his liberty. This definition corresponds to the more
general definition of an individual sovereign or self-governing
agent as a person who is subject to the authority of no other per-
son and has himself authority over the conduct of his life, and in
saying that these rights, as rights of self-government, secure for
and confer on their possessors freedom and authority to conduct
their lives, one refers respectively to the first and second condi-
tions of the definition.
Nor does the right to property, despite what one might natu-
rally think, conform to Bentham's analysis. Here one must distin-
guish between the natural right to property that the Traditional
Theory characterized and whatever rights, entitlements, or protec-
tions that being the owner of something entails. Ascribing this nat-
ural right to someone presupposes such rights, entitlements, or
protections as define some, presumably weak, notion of ownership,
but the natural right is not identical with any one or combination
of them. A person could possess the natural right to property yet,
owing say to a vow of poverty, own nothing, in which case he would
not possess or benefit directly from any of the rights, entitlements,
or protections that define ownership. Conversely, a person could
own many things yet, owing to extremely rigid institutions in his
society, be blocked in his attempts to acquire ownership of more
things and in his attempts to divest himself of ownership of things
he has, in which case his society would deny him his natural right
to property. The adolescent whose parents buy all his clothes and
decide when those clothes are to be discarded or handed down to
younger siblings receives no education in the exercise of this right,
while the adolescent whose parents give him a clothing allowance
and then leave the choice of wardrobe to him is given opportunity
to learn. Thus we may define the natural right to property in a way
that matches the above definition of the rights to life and liberty.
A person has the right to property if two conditions obtain: first,
that all others lack both the power to make him the owner of
something and the power to divest him of ownership of something,
and second, that he has both the power to acquire ownership of
things (through appropriation or recipience) and the power to
divest himself of ownership of things (through abandonment or
transfer).42 Unlike the concept of the right to life and the right to
4' The definition should make clear how the right to property can be inalienable while
property (i.e. ownership rights) is alienable. At least one commentator on The Declaration
of Independence has suggested, without questioning Jefferson's judgment, that Jefferson
substituted the right to pursue happiness for the right to property in the standard triad of
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liberty, however, the concept of the right to property entails the
notion that the right has bounds. Ascriptions of the rights to prop-
erty presuppose some notion of ownership and consequently they
presuppose duties consequent to or constitutive of whatever rights,
entitlements, or protections define that notion. These duties then
set bounds to the right. Plainly, though, the relation between these
duties and the right to property differs from the relations to which
Bentham appealed in arguing that rights necessarily have bounds.
The right to property has bounds, not because it is a right, but
because it concerns ownership. Hence, the right to property is con-
sistent with the proposition that the concept of a natural right
does not entail the notion that natural rights have bounds.
The immediate point to emphasize is not that Bentham failed
to include powers along with permissions and entitlements as a
category or rights. To the contrary, as we learn from Hart,4" Benu-
tham recognized powers as an important kind of right and
achieved a far-reaching understanding of them in attempting to
bring them under his general analysis. Rather, the point to empha-
size is that powers are not in all cases products of a system of law.
Bentham was simply mistaken in thinking otherwise.44 Powers
therefore provide a basis for reconstructing from the main tenets
of the Traditional Theory an intelligible concept of a natural right.
life, liberty, and property because he recognized that the right to property was preeminently
alienable. Perhaps this was Jefferson's reason, in which case he was confused. Alternatively,
Jefferson had other reasons, in which case the confusion is the commentator's. See M.
WHITE, supra note 10, at 213-15; see also Simmons, supra note 11, at 182 n.28 (similarly
confusing the right to property with ownership rights).
'1 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, ch. 8.
44 See supra text accompanying notes 29-32; see also H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 84,
194 n.1 (attributing Bentham's refusal to recognize non-legal powers and rights to his antip-
athy towards the notion of natural rights). To be sure, Bentham would not have recognized
as a central issue between himself and the champions of natural rights whether powers de-
finitive of rights could exist outside of a system of law, for he would have assumed that the
latter, if they had any theoretical perspective, regarded natural rights, and so the powers
they imply, as the offspring of natural law. Accordingly, he would have and did attack state-
ments about natural rights as having a completely false foundation, viz., as imaginary laws.
See J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, supra note 8, at 523; J. BENTHAM, Pannomial Frag-
ments, supra note 8, at 220.
Although the major architects of the Traditional Theory developed it within the con-
text of a theory of natural law, I have deliberately avoided discussing this context because,
for our purposes, it would be a distraction. Natural rights defined in relation to powers
cannot be the products of natural laws understood as laws imposing duties on men. The
general thesis, of course, is Hart's: to account for legal powers, power-conferring rules that
are independent of duty-imposing rules must be recognized. And this applies to systems of
natural law as well as to systems of positive law. Thus one can abstract the Traditional
Theory from the general context in which it was classically presented. For Hart's thesis,
see H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 27-41; infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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Nonetheless, we can not dismiss Bentham's objection entirely.
The question of bounds is still pertinent. The concept of a natural
right we have reconstructed may be intelligible and yet unusable.
If the right to liberty, to take the most obvious example, has no
bounds, then how the Critic of law can use it as a standard of jus-
tice would seem a mystery. Bentham's point, that to ascribe this
right to men is to make every legal imposition of a duty a wrong
that the state does to those upon whom it imposes this duty, an
infringement of their right to liberty, must be regarded as a serious
reductio ad absurdum of ascriptions of this right.45 The Critic
must have some way of distinguishing those duties the state justifi-
ably imposes on its subjects for the purpose of maintaining peace
among them and promoting their collective welfare from those du-
ties whose imposition is an infringement or denial of their right to
liberty. And the concept of the right as defined above clearly does
not provide it.
Now if the objection is put in this way and so is uncoupled
from Bentham's attack on the conceptual coherence of talk about
natural rights, then to answer it one must look beyond the concept
of a natural right to other elements of the Traditional Theory, the
most promising of which is the ideal the theory offers of a political
society as a cooperative association of equals who have consented
to those limits on their liberty and sacrifices of their material pos-
sessions that are necessary for a greater enjoyment of their natural
rights than they would have had in the state of nature. I shall not,
however, try to determine whether one can give a satisfactory an-
swer along these lines, for the objection is no less easily answered
when raised against using natural rights defined from elements of
the Traditional Theory as standards of justice than when raised
against so using them when they are defined as Mill proposed. The
objection applies to either conception with equal force, and hence
one must ground one's choice between them on other
considerations.
A brief description of Mill's conception will help us to see how
all this bears on Hart's own analyses of concepts of natural and
legal rights. Mill's conception reflects what I shall call the Welfare
Theory of Natural Rights.4' At the foundation of this theory are
two propositions. First, with respect to each basic, human good,
every human being has a right to that good. Second, if someone
lacks or is threatened with the loss of some basic, human good, he
5 J. BzNTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, supra note 9, at 502-04.
46 J.S. MILL, supra note 27, at 38-60.
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has a right, within the limits defined by the rights of others, to the
means necessary to secure or safeguard that good. From the state-
ment of these two propositions the Welfare Theory's criterion for
determining who possesses natural rights is obvious: being human.
Moreover, the central concept of a basic, human good, once it is
explained, yields a criterion for determining what specific natural
rights human beings possess. The general idea is that basic, human
goods are things that a human being must have to live tolerably
well and to fulfill his distinctively human endowment. They are, to
use Mill's description, "the essentials of human well-being. ' 47 To
give a complete list of these rights, the Welfare Theorist must fur-
ther explain this idea and present some facts about human life.
Clearly, though, he will include on his list the rights to liberty, se-
curity of one's person and property, food, clothing, and shelter.
Above all he will include the right to life, since life obviously comes
under the concept of a basic, human good. Finally, it is implicit in
the second proposition that possession of a natural right sets limits
on others' conduct toward the right-holder. That is, on the Welfare
Theory, a natural right is taken to be the ground for duties that
others individually or collectively bear in regard to their treatment
of the right-holder. Accordingly, to have a natural right to some-
thing is to have a claim on other individuals and on society to pro-
tect one against its loss, damage, or diminution or, if one lacks it
and it can be provided without infringement of the natural rights
of others, to provide one with it or at least make it available.4 8 The
right, in other words, grounds both duties of forebearance and du-
ties of positive service. In a sense, then, the Welfare Theory agrees
with Bentham's general analysis of rights, for on the conception of
natural rights it offers, rights are to be understood in relation to
the duties they ground. Thus, if we ignore Bentham's view that
duties definitive of rights are necessarily legal duties, these rights
will come under the general category I have labeled "entitle-
ments." Indeed, as Hart points out, Mill's account is strikingly
similar in its formulation to certain passages of Bentham's in
which Bentham offers "a half-mocking suggestion ... as to what
those who talk loosely about natural or nonlegal rights might con-
ceivably mean by asserting their existence, '49 though Hart later
adds that he has no evidence of Mill's having consciously followed
47 Id. at 55.
48 Id. at 49.
49 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 16.
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Bentham's suggestion in seriously working out his own account of
natural rights.50
These connections between the Welfare Theory and Ben-
tham's work, particularly the conceptual connection, make Hart's
remark that he believes the Welfare Theory to be the only theory
of natural rights that offers hope of satisfactorily answering Ben-
tham's objection surprising and ultimately puzzling. It represents
both a deviation from the earlier analysis of natural rights that he
gave in his highly influential article Are There Any Natural
Rights?51 and a deviation from the general analysis of legal rights
to which, in a qualified form, he still adheres.52 Both analyses ex-
hibit Hart's keen understanding of rights as essentially ex-
cercisable rather than as essentially beneficial positions or pro-
tected interests. 3 Legal rights, Hart likes to say, are legally
respected choices; 54 and to make and act on those choices, he
might continue, is to exercise one's rights. Thus, in the above-men-
tioned article on natural rights, Hart points out, as one way to dis-
tinguish his choice-centered analysis from the opposing benefit-
centered analysis, that if one followed his analysis, one would not
ascribe rights to animals and babies despite our having duties not
to ill-treat them.5 5 Such creatures are incapable of exercising
rights. They do not have or have not yet developed capacities for
making rational choices. On the Welfare Theory, by contrast, the
distinction between human beings who are capable of making ra-
tional choices and human beings who are not has no general rele-
vance to ascriptions of natural rights, though presumably one
would make exceptions where the possession of a natural right by a
rationally immature or mentally defective person would seriously
threaten his well-being. Likewise in his critical essay on Bentham's
analysis of legal rights, which also contains expositions of his own
general analysis, Hart, to capture vividly the notion of a right-
holder that inspires his analysis and distances it from Bentham's,
invokes the figure of a small-scale sovereign, a person who has su-
preme control over a certain area of his life and consequently
makes choices within that area that the law respects.5 6 On the Wel-
fare Theory, by contrast, natural rights are not conceived of as giv-
'o Id. at 89.
s See supra note 5.
52 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, ch. 7, reprinting in substantially similar form Hart, Ben-
tham on Legal Rights, in OxFoRD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 171 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973).
"Id. at 184.
Id. at 188-89.
"Id. at 180-82; cf. id at 184 n.86, 185 n.88.
H.L.A. HAT, supra note 1, at 183.
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ing their possessors sovereignty or authority over certain areas of
their lives. To be sure, each right-holder, in virtue of possessing
natural rights, is warranted in making demands on others should
they disregard or deny him his rights. But this is not to say that he
has power over them. Rather, it means that he would be justified
in making himself obnoxious to them should they treat him or
threaten to treat him unjustly and would be justified in resisting
the interferences and threats their injustice involves. On the evi-
dence, then, of Hart's past account of natural rights and his con-
tinued vigorous, though qualified, support of a choice-centered
analysis of legal rights, one would expect Hart to favor the Tradi-
tional Theory or some derivative of it over the Welfare Theory.
And if I am right in thinking that Bentham's most serious objec-
tion to the doctrine of the natural rights of man applies with equal
force to the Traditional Theory and the Welfare Theory, then Hart
need not have turned to the latter as offering the only prospect of
a viable theory of natural rights.
One might here wonder whether I have made too much of
Hart's concluding remark in his essay comparing Bentham's and
Mill's views on natural rights, for it is not the conclusion of any
argument in that essay but only an observation on the current
state of philosophical debate on the subject. But the incongruity is
not confined to this one remark. It reappears at the end of Hart's
essay on legal rights. There, after criticizing Bentham's analysis
and expounding his own, Hart takes up a kind of right that he had
not previously considered, a kind exemplified by fundamental
rights such as those that are incorporated into the constitutional
law of many nations through a bill of rights. Rights of this kind,
Hart acknowledges, fail to fit his analysis because their import is to
secure for their possessors certain freedoms and benefits necessary
for a decent human life and because they secure these freedoms
and benefits by limiting certain exercises of legislative power.57
And having acknowledged these as rights his own analysis cannot
accommodate, he acknowledges as well their moral analogues:
rights commonly invoked by social theorists and critics of law. 8
Such rights are, in effect, the natural rights the Welfare Theory
specifies, and, in a gesture toward interests beyond the everyday
interests of the practicing lawyer and the special interests of the
jurist, Hart notes that the work of such theorists and critics is no
less significant than that of lawyers and jurists and that the rights
" Id. at 189.
'~Id.
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the former use to interpret and criticize the law lie outside the
reach of his general analysis.
This last concession may reflect Hart's belief that only the
Welfare Theory offers hope for a viable theory of natural rights,
but it need not. Hart, while affirming, as he does, the importance
of certain perspectives on the law that differ from his own, could
still criticize from his perspective, that of analytical jurisprudence,
the notion of rights that those adopting different perspectives ap-
ply. Ecumenism, after all, does not mean that one must accept all
the central doctrines of those with whom one unites in common
cause. Hart could press against the Welfare Theory the same gen-
eral criticism he makes of the benefit-centered analysis of legal
rights, that the concept of a right at work in the Welfare Theory is
superfluous since it is parasitic on the concept of a duty, or, in
other words, that on the Welfare Theory's conceptual scheme,
ascribing a right to someone adds nothing to the ascription of the
correlative duty.5 9 Hart could make this criticism and at the same
time recognize its irrelevance to those for whom the concept serves
important rhetorical and programmatic purposes. But, as I said,
Hart's concession may actually reflect his belief that the Welfare
Theory is the only theory to be considered as viable, and he would
not, I believe, press the criticism strongly if he thought he could
not present a constructive alternative.60
The incongruity appears most striking in Hart's explanation of
why his general analysis cannot accommodate constitutional rights
such as those granted in bills of rights. As I understand the expla-
nation, on the one hand, these are rights that represent legally se-
cured benefits or legally protected interests but, on the other, the
concept of a right that applies to them does not fit Bentham's
analysis nor other standard benefit-centered analyses. This means
that the concept is not parasitic on the concept of a duty and
therefore cannot be resolved or made to disappear in the way that
those legally secured benefits that Bentham regarded as rights but
that fall outside Hart's analysis can. Being legally secured benefits,
according to Hart, these rights also fall outside his analysis; and so
Hart concludes that his analysis is not completely general. Clearly,
the crucial question is whether one must regard such rights as le-
gally secured benefits, and specifically, whether one must interpret
them as analogues of natural rights conceived of according to the
Welfare Theory. It would surely be surprising, given the history of
59 Id. at 181-82.
60 Id. at 182.
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the institution of a bill of rights, to discover that one could not
interpret them as analogues of natural rights conceived of accord-
ing to the Traditional Theory. That such rights place limits on leg-
islative power, which is to say on sovereign authority, strongly sug-
gests that such an interpretation can be found. On this
interpretation, one would construe these rights not as essentially
protecting their possessors in their enjoyment of basic, human
goods but as essentially securing for them freedom in areas of their
lives over which they are the proper authorities or as protecting
them from abuses of sovereign power that no self-governing agent,
concerned to preserve and improve his life, would, in consenting to
the establishment of a government as part of the cooperative asso-
ciation he forms with others for the purpose of greater enjoyment
of his natural rights, put himself at risk of suffering. My point, of
course, is not that this is a better interpretation of these rights, but
only that it is a plausible one. For if it is plausible, then, while it
does not save Hart from having to qualify his general analysis in
acknowledgment of these constitutional rights, it does allow him to
avoid the disharmony in his views that the qualification produces.
Perhaps not every legal right is a legally respected choice, but
every legal right holder can still be regarded as or as having once
been a small-scale sovereign.
II
When we speak of one person as having authority over an-
other, of Smith, say, as having authority over Jones, we typically
have in mind that Smith, by exercising this authority, can impose
some duty on Jones. This is not, of course, the only way one person
can exercise authority over another, but it is paradigmatic. Smith,
in having this authority, has a power that he exercises when he
imposes a duty on Jones. The power is a right of a certain kind,
and thus we can say that Smith has a right that he exercises when
he imposes the duty, and can add that he could also exercise this
right, or some distinct but associated right, for the purpose of en-
forcing compliance. Finally, Smith has this authority in virtue of
possessing the right, or some greater and encompassing right, and
not vice versa, for if Smith's authority were challenged, he could
invoke the right in reply, whereas if his possessing this right were
challenged, citing his authority could not be a satisfactory reply. I
ask the reader to forgive this tedious description of certain rela-
tions among the concepts of authority, power, and right. While not
strictly necessary, it should help to make clear a certain quirk in
the conceptual scheme on which Bentham constructed his positiv-
ist theory of law.
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Let us recur to Bentham's definition of sovereign authority,
the definition on which, as I remarked, his separation of law and
morality depends. 1 In this definition no mention is to be found of
a right that the person or persons who have sovereign authority
possess. Nor could Bentham have allowed, given his views about
rights, that one could correctly describe the sovereign as possessing
such rights as a right to govern or a right to legislate. Rights, on
Bentham's conceptual scheme, were derived at one remove from
laws, duties being the immediate derivatives.2 Permissions and en-
titlements exhausted the class of rights, and these were all defined
in relation to duties. Duties in turn were defined in relation to laws
that prohibited or required some type of conduct. Thus, one could
ascribe a right to govern to the sovereign only if some law required
that the subjects submit to the sovereign's will, and plainly Ben-
tham could not acknowledge the existence of such a law without
either falling into an infinite regress or affirming what he would
surely never affirm, natural law."3 Given, then, that Bentham must
deny that one can correctly describe the sovereign as possessing
such rights as the right to govern and given also his thesis that
every legal power is a legal right,6 4 it follows that Bentham must
hold that one cannot correctly describe the sovereign as possessing
such powers as a power to govern. Yet Bentham certainly held that
the sovereign possessed such powers. 5 It would appear then that
Bentham's conceptual scheme contains, not merely a quirk, but an
outright contradiction.
Bentham's only way out of this contradiction, if there is a way
out, would seem to lie in his excepting some powers, namely sover-
eign powers, from the class of rights. And he appears to have laid
the ground for so regarding sovereign powers when, in discussing
how a divided sovereignty is possible, he described sovereign power
as arising out of the disposition of the subjects to obey. This
description, however, simply raises the question whether Bentham
" See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
62 J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS, supra note 6, at 293-94.
" The right to govern clearly could not, on Bentham's analysis, be a permission, since a
right of this sort assumes that the right holder is subject to some laws that impose duties on
him. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. But cf. infra text following note 65.
"J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS, supra note 6, at 84, 220 n.a.; cf. J. BENTHAM, supra note 23, at
205 n.e2.
"J. BENTHAM, supra note 23, at 200.
" "[T]he efficient cause then of the power of the sovereign is neither more nor less than
the disposition to obedience on the part of the people." J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS, supra note 6,
at 18 n.b; see also J. BENTHAM, Complete Code of Laws, supra note 40, at 196.
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conceived of sovereign power as a legal power comparable to other
legal powers except for not being a right or alternatively as a natu-
ral phenomenon like fire, which one might describe as arising out
of the disposition of combustible materials to burn. Bentham can-
not, I think, have it both ways, and if he opted for the latter, he
would have made his position irrelevant to legal theory. "Sovereign
power" as he understood the term and "sovereign power" under-
stood as a term that means a power to govern or a supreme power
to legislate would merely be homonyms. The sovereign, according
to this latter reading of Bentham's position, would in making a
law, not be exercising sovereign power but rather, once the sub-
jects had obeyed, demonstrating or manifesting it. On the other
hand, if Bentham opted for the former, he would have invited the
charge of having repaired his conceptual scheme ad hoc, and
thereby thrown his entire conception of rights into doubt.
In fact, a certain change in his conception of rights could obvi-
ate this charge. One could, without overturning Bentham's concep-
tion, ascribe rights to the sovereign on the ground that the person
or persons who have sovereign authority are not, when acting in
their capacity as sovereign authorities, subject to any duties. In do-
ing this one would then bring the rights of a sovereign under Ben-
tham's general concept of a right resulting from the absence of a
duty. But to accept this change Bentham would have had to re-
place his thesis that laws and only laws create rights with the
weaker thesis that a system of law is a necessary condition for the
ascription of rights, and he would have had to allow that one could
ascribe a right, in the sense of a permission, to a person who had
no duties, who was indeed subject to no laws. He would, in other
words, have had to accept rights that had no bounds.
This change in Bentham's conception of rights would thus al-
low sovereign powers to count as rights and would not itself invite
the charge of having been made ad hoc. The contradiction can
then be avoided, but a quirk in Bentham's conceptual scheme is
the result. For on this scheme, the sovereign's rights have no con-
ceptual relation to sovereign authority. In ascribing rights to the
sovereign one indicates the freedom the sovereign has, but nothing
about sovereign authority, which is determined by the subjects'
dispositions to obey, thereby follows. Sovereign rights and powers
are therefore conceptually independent of sovereign authority, and
this fact about Bentham's revised conceptual scheme puts it at
odds with our ordinary understanding of the relations among the
concepts of right, power, and authority. This result would not, per-
haps, have disturbed Bentham, but it should stir misgivings in
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those not already firmly committed to the classical positivist
theory.
The quirk I have described gives an indication of a more per-
vasive defect in Bentham's theory, a defect that Hart exposes in
the essays on legal powers and limited sovereignty.17 Thus, Hart
writes concerning the powers of subordinate legislators:
What most needs to be stressed as a corrective to Ben-
tham's account is that the fact that a person or body of per-
sons is legally permitted, i.e. not prohibited by law, to issue
orders is not equivalent to the recognition of the issue by such
person or persons of such orders as a criterion of their validity
or enforceability. Conversely, the fact that the issue of such
orders is not permitted but is an offence must be distin-
guished from the invalidity of such orders even if these two
features are commonly found together. 8
And Hart shows, in a masterly critique of Bentham's position, that
Bentham's conceptual scheme cannot ground an adequate under-
standing of what makes laws, orders, and exercises of legal powers
generally valid or invalid because it provides no way of distinguish-
ing between a legal nullity and a legal offense.6 9 This inadequacy
makes clear why even on the revision of Bentham's scheme I have
suggested sovereign rights and powers cannot be tied conceptually
to sovereign authority. The flaw this quirk represents is fatal to
Bentham's definition of sovereign authority, and this means that
his conception of the authority of law succumbs as well.
Hart too is concerned with articulating a conception of the au-
thority of law, and in the last essay he sketches a conception that
is consistent with his own theory of legal positivism.70 His chief
aim in this essay is to explicate and incorporate into his theory the
concept of an authoritative legal reason, for he believes that such a
concept is indispensable to understanding those features of law
and legal systems that he showed to be beyond the explanatory
power of Bentham's theory. 1 Moreover, Hart recognizes that the
most serious recent challenges to the positivist's thesis that law is
separate from morality focus on the reasons that the officials of a
legal system, its judges in particular, act on or at least cite to jus-
67 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, chs. 8 & 9.
48 Id. at 214.
61 Id. at 210-14, 239-42.
70 Id. ch. 10.
7 Id. at 243.
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tify the legal actions they perform and the statements of law they
make. Therefore, Hart acknowledges, to answer these challenges
the legal positivist must develop as part of his theory an account of
these authoritative legal reasons.72 This, in effect, is an account of
the authority of law.
Rather than enter directly into this debate between Hart and
his opponents, let us first consider whether Hart's account of the
authority of law satisfactorily shows that the law has authority
apart from any moral authority it may have. The opponent of legal
positivism of course denies this proposition. He holds that the
law's authority is a species of moral authority, just as he holds that
the duties and rights the law imposes and confers are species of
moral duty and moral right. But against such an opponent Hart
has drawn successfully on the conceptual resources of his positivist
theory in presenting cogent analyses of the concepts of legal duty
and legal right that make problematic any inference from an
ascription of a legal duty or a legal right to an ascription of a moral
duty or a moral right.73 Specifically, his theory explains legal phe-
nomena, including the bearing of legal duties and the possession of
legal rights, as constituted and regulated by social rules, and such
rules, as Hart has pointed out, need not be moral rules or have
moral force in the lives of those who accept them.7 4 Rules of games
and etiquette are clear examples. Accordingly, one can characterize
the kind of rules constitutive of a legal system (i.e., legal rules)
without making use of any moral concepts, and the same then
holds for characterizing the kinds of duties and rights the law im-
poses and confers (i.e., legal duties and legal rights). It is interest-
ing, though, that Hart cannot follow the same strategy in arguing
that legal authority is not a species of moral authority. The strat-
egy will not work because legal authority is a feature of legal rules
and thus is not definable in terms of them. Any legal rule used in
proposing such a definition would itself have legal authority or
confer legal authority, and consequently such a definition would
presuppose that which it was intended to explain.7 5 Analyzing the
72 Id. at 262-65.
71 See id. chs. 6 & 7; Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSO-
PHY 82-107 (A.I. Melden ed. 1958).
"' Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. Rav. 593
(1958), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 40 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975).
7' This point suggests that the relations among the concepts of authority, power, and
right that I sketched in this section's opening paragraph are not completely general. If the
authority of law is a species of authority over persons, then since one cannot cite some legal
rule to explain or ground that authority, it follows that no right backs it up. Thus we may
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concept of legal authority serves, therefore, to test the power of
Hart's theory to explain an aspect of legal systems he had not pre-
viously considered.
Hart does not approach the problem exactly in this way.
Rather, as I indicated above, he attempts to construct a concept of
an authoritative legal reason that fits his positivist theory of law.
But if by invoking such a concept he can explain how legal rules
provide officials of a legal system and others who accept the law's
authority with what we would intuitively regard as authoritative
reasons for taking certain actions and issuing certain decisions,
namely legal or lawful actions and decisions of law, then he can
explain how legal rules have or confer authority that is distinct
from any moral authority they may have; and hence, he can ex-
plain the authority of law consistently with the positivist thesis
that law is separate from morality.
Hart proceeds by constructing, on the basis of reflections
about Bentham's account of what a command is, a general concept,
which he takes to be the concept of an authoritative reason, 7 and
from this construction it is clear how one can derive the specific
concept that he takes to be that of an authoritative legal reason. A
reason for action is, according to Hart's construction, an authorita-
tive reason if it meets two conditions: it must be what Hart calls
content-independent and it must be what he calls peremptory.
First, content-independence. Hart does not give a precise account
of this condition," but his general idea can be grasped from an
example. 8 If one is advised to do some act because it would be
humane or would reduce the suffering of farm animals, then the
advice, if true, is a reason for doing the act because of something
about the act's character or consequences. By contrast, if one is
reminded that one has promised to do some act, the reminder con-
regard the law's authority as an instance of supreme authority and accordingly conclude
that the conceptual relations I sketched do not apply to supreme authority. This conclusion
certainly squares with other instances of supreme authority such as the authority that a
believer understands God to have and the authority that a young child sees his parents as
having. One would not, after all, expect God to invoke a right if His authority as ruler of the
universe were challenged, and a child's moral development must be fairly far advanced
before questions of legitimacy would occur to him. A child's early concept of authority does
not lend itself to such questions. See J. PLAGRT, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 18, 67
(M. Gabain trans. 1950) (Piaget discusses the stage of child development where "rules are
regarded a sacred and untouchable, emanating from adults and lasting forever.").
7 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 252-61.
" Id. at 254-55.
78 See Hart, supra note 73, at 102, where Hart first introduces the notion of content-
independence.
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veys a reason for doing the act without reference to the act's char-
acter or consequences. Rather, it calls one's attention to one's hav-
ing uttered or written certain words in circumstances in which
uttering or writing those words constituted a promise to do the act.
For the act of promising generates independently of the promised
act's character or consequences a reason for doing what one prom-
ised. After all, within limits, one can promise to do any of indefi-
nitely many kinds of acts and thereby generate a reason for doing
what one promised, and this should make clear that one's having
promised is a reason for doing the promised act regardless of the
kind of act it is, as determined by its character or consequences. It
is in this sense that having promised is a content-independent
reason.
The second condition concerns the role an authoritative rea-
son is supposed to have in deliberation.79 As Hart puts it, the rea-
son, being a peremptory reason, is supposed to "cut off any inde-
pendent deliberation." 80 Thus, that I owe ten dollars to a friend is
a reason that should, if I understand and accept how it is supposed
to function in deliberation, stop me from weighing the advantages
and disadvantages of spending on this or that diversion the ten
dollars I have just earned. It is not, then, a reason that I am sup-
posed to weigh against these other reasons in reaching a decision
on what to do with the money I have earned and accordingly I
would not, in taking it as determinative of what I should do, regard
it as weightier than these other reasons. Rather, I would regard it
as having ruled them out of consideration. It is in this sense that
owing ten dollars is a peremptory reason.
Now the reasons for action that the rules that constitute a le-
gal system provide to its officials and others who accept its author-
ity clearly satisfy these two conditions. What Hart considers to be
the fundamental rules of a legal system, its rules of recognition, are
paramount examples.81 That a legislature has enacted certain mea-
sures or that a court has handed down a certain decision is both a
content-independent and a peremptory reason for conforming
one's behavior to, or rendering a decision in accordance with, these
measures or that prior decision. These then are authoritative rea-
sons, and since they originate from legal rules, they are authorita-
tive legal reasons. From this result it is a short step to conclude
79 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 253-54.
80 Id. at 253.
81 Id. at 260-61. For Harts allowance for speaking of rules of recognition instead of a
single, complex rule of recognition, see id. at 155 n.77.
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that legal rules, in being the source of authoritative reasons, confer
authority on the legislative enactments and judicial decisions they
identify as law, the offices they define, and the orders and injunc-
tions they ground. The inference is immediate, though it is impor-
tant to recognize that in making it one presupposes general accept-
ance of these rules as providing content-independent, peremptory
reasons for action by the people subject to them or at least by "a
well organized or powerful minority able to coerce by threats the
majority into acquiescence." '82 In this way Hart explains the au-
thority of law consistently with his positivist theory.
Hart's general account of authority fits nicely the standard
cases that are likely to come to mind: the authority of military
commanders, of parents, of religious leaders, and even of sacred
texts (anyone who has puzzled over the whys and wherefores of
religious ritual should appreciate immediately the content-inde-
pendent character of the reasons that quoting scripture provides to
believers). As an account of an essential feature of authority then,
Hart's exposition is persuasive. I am not, however, persuaded that
Hart has gotten at the whole essence of authority. There is, I
think, something more to having authority over persons than being
for them the source of content-independent, peremptory reasons
for action. And if Hart's account leaves out something essential,
then it falls short of being a satisfactory answer to the opponents
of positivism.
Consider for example the relation of a host to his guests. We
would not characterize this relation by saying that a host had au-
thority over his guests. He does not. Perhaps there is a temptation
to think otherwise owing to his being at the same time thought of
as the proprietor of the premises on which the party he is giving is
held. But his position as proprietor and his role as host are easily
distinguished. And in the latter he does not have or exercise au-
thority. Yet the instructions he gives and the requests he makes
convey to his guests content-independent, peremptory reasons for
action. To be sure, the limits within which his instructions and re-
quests convey such reasons are very much narrower than those
within which making a promise generates such a reason. But this
difference is not grounds for denying their content-independence.83
82 Id. at 257. See also id. at 256, where Hart stresses the importance of this acceptance
as "a distinctive normative attitude not a mere 'habit' of obedience. . .[which] is the nu-
cleus of a whole group of normative phenomena, including ... the general notion of
authority."
"8 Id. at 255-56.
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Nor can the peremptory character of his reasons be denied. Of
course a guest might, upon hearing from his host that his place at
the dinner table is between the Browns, weigh the pros and cons of
compliance and sitting between the boring Browns against those of
noncompliance and sitting between the far more entertaining
Greens, but a promisor too can treat the reason his promise gener-
ates in this way, that is, as not peremptory. The point is that he is
not supposed to treat it in this way; and the same holds for reasons
the host conveys. To sit between the Greens when the host has
indicated that one's place is between the Browns is simply not
done.
Having authority over others, therefore, entails more than be-
ing the source for them of content-independent, peremptory rea-
sons for action. Hence Hart's account of such authority is at best
incomplete. Whether he can complete it in a way that is consistent
with legal positivism is an open question. But surely to the oppo-
nents of positivism the account's deficiency will represent an op-
portunity for a forceful reply to the effect that authority over per-
sons is essentially a moral concept and that consequently the
deficiency can be removed only by construing the law's authority
as having moral force in the lives of those who accept it. The two
opponents Hart considers, Dworkin and Raz, s4 both have advanced
highly cognitivist views of the internal relation between law and
morality. On such views the deficiency is to be removed either by
recognizing that the law's authority, in a given legal system, de-
rives from the moral principles that are at the foundations of that
system or by recognizing that the law's authority derives from the
normative force of statements of law, and that those who make sin-
cere statements of law are committed to holding that those state-
ments are grounded on objective, moral reasons.85 A third alterna-
tive, a noncognitivist alternative, is worth noting. To adapt for this
purpose a remark of Hume's, authority, more exactly supreme au-
thority, "is more properly felt than judg'd of."' On this view, the
deficiency is to be removed by recognizing the emotional bond that
officials of a legal system and others subject to it form to the insti-
tution, which bond gives to the law a felt authority, and then argu-
ing that, because the emotions in question are moral emotions, the
law's authority is a species of moral authority. Judging from a re-
84 Id. at 147-161.
88 Id. at 148-61, 264-65.
86 D. HumE, supra note 7, at 470. See supra note 75 for the reason Hume's remark is
best adapted to supreme authority.
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mark Hart makes in discussing Raz's view, 87 I believe he would be
more sympathetic to the third alternative. But regardless of which
alternative is more congenial to his views or more theoretically
sound, unless Hart can find a way to revise his account of author-
ity without abandoning legal positivism, he will have to accept the
authority of law as a point of intersection between law and moral-
ity the existence of which he has long denied.
67 H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 159.
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